LingoLoop Attack: Trapping MLLMs via Linguistic Context and State Entrapment into Endless Loops

Abstract: Multimodal LLMs (MLLMs) have shown great promise but require substantial computational resources during inference. Attackers can exploit this by inducing excessive output, leading to resource exhaustion and service degradation. Prior energy-latency attacks aim to increase generation time by broadly shifting the output token distribution away from the EOS token, but they neglect the influence of token-level Part-of-Speech (POS) characteristics on EOS and sentence-level structural patterns on output counts, limiting their efficacy. To address this, we propose LingoLoop, an attack designed to induce MLLMs to generate excessively verbose and repetitive sequences. First, we find that the POS tag of a token strongly affects the likelihood of generating an EOS token. Based on this insight, we propose a POS-Aware Delay Mechanism to postpone EOS token generation by adjusting attention weights guided by POS information. Second, we identify that constraining output diversity to induce repetitive loops is effective for sustained generation. We introduce a Generative Path Pruning Mechanism that limits the magnitude of hidden states, encouraging the model to produce persistent loops. Extensive experiments demonstrate LingoLoop can increase generated tokens by up to 30 times and energy consumption by a comparable factor on models like Qwen2.5-VL-3B, consistently driving MLLMs towards their maximum generation limits. These findings expose significant MLLMs' vulnerabilities, posing challenges for their reliable deployment. The code will be released publicly following the paper's acceptance.