The geometry of inconvenience and perverse equilibria in trade networks (2504.07700v1)

Abstract: The structure bilateral trading costs is one of the key features of international trade. Drawing upon the freeness-of-trade matrix, which allows the modeling of N-state trade costs, we develop a ``geometry of inconvenience'' to better understand how they impact equilbrium outcomes. The freeness-of-trade matrix was introduced in a model by Mossay and Tabuchi, where they essentially proved that if a freeness-of-trade matrix is positive definite, then the corresponding model admits a unique equilibrium. Drawing upon the spectral theory of metrics, we prove the model admits nonunique, perverse, equilibria. We use this result to provide a family of policy relevant bipartite examples, with substantive applications to economic sanctions. More generally, we show how the network structure of the freeness of trade is central to understanding the impacts of policy interventions.