Addressing the Subsumption Thesis: A Formal Bridge between Microeconomics and Active Inference (2503.05048v1)

Abstract: As a unified theory of sentient behaviour, active inference is formally intertwined with multiple normative theories of optimal behaviour. Specifically, we address what we call the subsumption thesis: The claim that expected utility from economics, as an account of agency, is subsumed by active inference. To investigate this claim, we present multiple examples that challenge the subsumption thesis. To formally compare these two accounts of agency, we analyze the objective functions for MDPs and POMDPs. By imposing information-theoretic rationality bounds (ITBR) on the expected utility agent, we find that the resultant agency is equivalent to that of active inference in MDPs, but slightly different in POMDPs. Rather than being strictly resolved, the subsumption thesis motivates the construction of a formal bridge between active inference and expected utility. This highlights the necessary formal assumptions and frameworks to make these disparate accounts of agency commensurable.