Mutation mitigates finite-size effects in spatial evolutionary games

Abstract: Agent-based simulations are essential for studying cooperation on spatial networks. However, finite-size effects -- random fluctuations due to limited network sizes -- can cause certain strategies to unexpectedly dominate or disappear, leading to unreliable outcomes. While enlarging network sizes or carefully preparing initial states can reduce these effects, both approaches require significant computational resources. In this study, we demonstrate that incorporating mutation into simulations on limited networks offers an effective and resource-efficient alternative. Using spatial optional public goods games and a more intricate tolerance-based variant, we find that rare mutations preserve inherently stable equilibria. When equilibria are affected by finite-size effects, introducing moderate mutation rates prevent finite-size-induced strategy dominance or extinction, producing results consistent with large-network simulations. Our findings position mutation as a practical tool for improving the reliability of agent-based models and emphasize the importance of mutation sensitivity analysis in managing finite-size effects across spatial networks.