A dynamic auction for multilateral collaboration

Published 10 Nov 2024 in econ.TH and cs.GT | (2411.06545v1)

Abstract: We study the problem of multilateral collaboration among agents with transferable utilities. Any group of agents can sign a contract consisting of a primitive contract and monetary transfers among the signatories. We propose a dynamic auction that finds a stable outcome when primitive contracts are gross complements for all participants.

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Chao Huang

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