When Audits and Recounts Distract from Election Integrity: The 2020 U.S. Presidential Election in Georgia (2408.00055v2)

Abstract: Georgia was central to efforts to overturn the 2020 Presidential election, including a call from then-president Trump to Georgia Secretary of State Raffensperger asking Raffensperger to find' 11,780 votes. Raffensperger has maintained that a100% full-count risk-limiting audit' and a machine recount agreed with the initial machine-count results, which proved that the reported election results were accurate and that no votes were flipped.' There is no indication of widespread fraud, but there is reason to distrust the election outcome: the two machine counts and the manualaudit' tallies disagree substantially, even about the number of ballots cast. Some ballots in Fulton County were included in the original count at least twice; some were included in the machine recount at least thrice. Audit results for some tally batches were omitted from the reported audit totals. The two machine counts and the audit were not probative of who won because of poor processes and controls: a lack of secure physical chain of custody, ballot accounting, pollbook reconciliation, and accounting for other election materials such as memory cards. Moreover, most voters voted with demonstrably untrustworthy ballot-marking devices, so even a perfect handcount or audit would not necessarily reveal who really won. True risk-limiting audits (RLAs) and rigorous recounts can limit the risk that an incorrect electoral outcome will be certified rather than being corrected. But no procedure can limit that risk without a trustworthy record of the vote. And even a properly conducted RLA of some contests in an election does not show that any other contests in that election were decided correctly. The 2020 U.S. Presidential election in Georgia illustrates unrecoverable errors that can render recounts and audits `security theater' that distract from the more serious problems rather than justifying trust.

• The paper assesses Georgia’s election audit and recount methods, revealing that procedural flaws undermine the reliability of reported outcomes.
• It identifies significant inconsistencies between initial machine counts and hand-count audits, exposing weaknesses in chain-of-custody protocols.
• The study recommends measures such as hand-marked ballots and rigorous risk-limiting audits to enhance electoral integrity.

An Examination of Electoral Audit and Recount Efficacy: Insights from the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election in Georgia

The focal point of Philip B. Stark's paper is the multi-faceted assessment of the audit and recount procedures conducted during the 2020 U.S. Presidential election in Georgia. The research critically examines the assertions of election reliability by state officials, juxtaposing them against empirical inconsistencies found in the voting and counting process. Despite the absence of evidence pointing to a misreported outcome, the paper argues that the mechanisms used in Georgia are inadequate to unambiguously confirm the authenticity of the reported winner due to the inadequacies in the processes and lack of a secure voting record.

The paper scrutinizes the efficacy of the risk-limiting audits (RLAs) and recounts, suggesting that they served more as a façade rather than a solid assurance of electoral integrity. Stark identifies significant discrepancies between multiple counts, specifically the initial machine count, the hand-count audit, and the subsequent machine recount. These inconsistencies underscore lapses in the physical custody of ballots, improper chain-of-custody protocols, and highlight the untrustworthiness of the ballot-marking devices (BMDs) predominantly utilized in the Georgia voting system.

One of the central tenets of the paper is the argument that BMDs, though a staple of contemporary election systems, are inherently vulnerable to hacking and misconfiguration, casting doubt on the veracity of their printout records. Despite efforts such as logic and accuracy testing and on-election day scrutiny, these devices fail to incontrovertibly ensure the integrity of voters' intended selections. The paper supports this stance by referencing existing empirical research that indicates a low likelihood of voters detecting errors in BMD printouts.

Stark's findings indicate procedural and administrative deficits that prevent the creation of a trustworthy vote record. The documented inability to maintain consistent counts, as exemplified by repeated inclusion and omission of votes across recount processes, challenges the state’s claims of audit accuracy. Furthermore, the paper illustrates instances of duplicated or omitted batches in the recount and audit processes, raising substantive questions about the controls in place for safeguarding election integrity.

The paper proposes critical improvements to address the existing systemic shortcomings:

1. Providing voters with the opportunity to mark ballots by hand—thereby minimizing reliance on BMDs.
2. Enhancing procedures for ballot accounting and chain-of-custody, ensuring all election materials are meticulously tracked.
3. Implementing more rigorous internal consistency checks as part of the election canvass.
4. Conducting genuine risk-limiting audits as opposed to superficial ones, entailing a trustworthy physical audit trail and transparent processes.

The implications of this research are profound both practically and theoretically. It advocates for robust electoral systems that can withstand scrutiny and deliver consequently reliable outcomes. Moving forward, the field of election security and auditing might explore innovations in security measures and audit protocols that address both technological vulnerabilities and procedural laxities suggested by this paper.

Stark’s paper provides a compelling examination of the limitations of election audit processes and highlights the necessity for reform in electoral systems to ensure electoral outcomes are beyond reproach. This research contributes knowledge that can potentially drive electoral process improvements globally, engendering credibility and trust in democratic systems.