2000 character limit reached
Success functions in large contests
Published 11 Mar 2024 in econ.TH | (2403.07152v2)
Abstract: We consider contests with a large set (continuum) of participants and axiomatize contest success functions that arise when performance is composed of both effort and a random element, and when winners are those whose performance exceeds a cutoff determined by a market clearing condition. A co-monotonicity property is essentially all that is needed for a representation in the general case, but significantly stronger conditions must hold to obtain an additive structure. We illustrate the usefulness of this framework by revisiting some of the classic questions in the contests literature.
- Grantmaking, grading on a curve, and the paradox of relative evaluation in nonmarkets. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, page qjad046, 2023.
- Yaron Azrieli. Temporary exclusion in repeated contests. arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.06257, 2024.
- S Keith Berry. Rent-seeking with multiple winners. Public Choice, 77(2):437–443, 1993.
- A multi-winner nested rent-seeking contest. Public Choice, 87:177–184, 1996.
- Contest success functions: an extension. Economic Theory, 11:201–204, 1998.
- Large tullock contests. Journal of Economics, pages 1–11, 2023.
- Turning up the heat: The discouraging effect of competition in contests. Journal of Political Economy, 128(5):1940–1975, 2020.
- The winner-take-all principle in small tournaments. Advances in applied microeconomics, 7:61–74, 1998.
- Optimal large population tullock contests. Oxford Open Economics, page odad003, 2023.
- Rent dissipation in large population tullock contests. Public Choice, 197(1):253–282, 2023.
- Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts. Journal of political Economy, 89(5):841–864, 1981.
- RÂ Duncan Luce. Individual choice behavior: A theoretical analysis. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959.
- The optimal allocation of prizes in contests. American Economic Review, 91(3):542–558, 2001.
- The ponds dilemma. The Economic Journal, 128(611):1634–1682, 2018.
- Johannes Münster. Group contest success functions. Economic Theory, 41(2):345–357, 2009.
- Population uncertainty in contests. Economic Theory, 27:469–474, 2006.
- Shmuel Nitzan. Modelling rent-seeking contests. European Journal of Political Economy, 10(1):41–60, 1994.
- Large contests. Econometrica, 84(2):835–854, 2016.
- Bid caps in large contests. Games and Economic Behavior, 115:101–112, 2019.
- Performance-maximizing large contests. Theoretical Economics, 15(1):57–88, 2020.
- Generalized contest success functions. Economic Theory, 40:139–149, 2009.
- Dana Sisak. Multiple-prize contests–the optimal allocation of prizes. Journal of Economic Surveys, 23(1):82–114, 2009.
- Stergios Skaperdas. Contest success functions. Economic Theory, 7:283–290, 1996.
- Gordon Tullock. Efficient rent seeking. jm buchanan, rd tollison, g. tullock, eds., toward a theory of the rent seeking society. A & M University Press, College Station, TX: Texas, 1980.
- Gordon Tullock. Efficient rent seeking. In Efficient rent-seeking: Chronicle of an intellectual quagmire, pages 3–16. Springer, 2001.
Paper Prompts
Sign up for free to create and run prompts on this paper using GPT-5.
Top Community Prompts
Collections
Sign up for free to add this paper to one or more collections.
