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Application of Nash equilibrium for developing an optimal forest harvesting strategy in Toruń Forest District

Published 6 Mar 2024 in cs.GT | (2403.03555v1)

Abstract: This study investigates the application of Nash equilibrium strategies in optimizing forest harvesting decisions, focusing on multiple management objectives in forestry. Through simulation-based analysis, the research explores the evolution of various indicators during the game: 1) the mass of CO2 sequestration, 2) forest stands biodiversity, 3) the harvested wood volume, 4) native species fraction, and 5) protective functions. The results underscore the importance of considering diverse objectives and balancing competing interests in forestry decision processes. The forest stands designated for harvesting in the Toru\'n Forest District were defined as the initial strategy, and indicators for all objectives were calculated accordingly. A Nash equilibrium was identified through a game involving five players representing individual objectives with partially conflicting aims. The final strategy was obtained by modifying specific forest stands designated for harvesting, thereby maintaining the planned wood volume extraction while simultaneously reducing biodiversity loss by nearly 40%, preserving protective functions across over 600 hectares of forested areas, enhancing decadal carbon sequestration in the forest district by 100,000 tons, and additionally improving species suitability by nearly 10%. The findings suggest the potential for further research and refinement of Nash equilibrium-based optimization approaches to enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of forest management practices.

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