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When and Where To Submit A Paper

Published 29 Jan 2024 in econ.TH | (2402.01745v1)

Abstract: What is the optimal order in which a researcher should submit their papers to journals of differing quality? I analyze a sequential search model without recall where the researcher's expected value from journal submission depends on the history of past submissions. Acceptances immediately terminate the search process and deliver some payoff, while rejections carry information about the paper's quality, affecting the researcher's belief in acceptance probability over future journals. When journal feedback does not change the paper's quality, the researcher's optimal strategy is monotone in their acceptance payoff. Submission costs distort the researcher's effective acceptance payoff, but maintain monotone optimality. If journals give feedback which can affect the paper's quality, such as through \textit{referee reports}, the search order can change drastically depending on the agent's prior belief about their paper's quality. However, I identify a set of \textit{assortative matched} conditions on feedback such that monotone strategies remain optimal whenever the agent's prior is sufficiently optimistic.

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