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No Ascending Auction can find Equilibrium for SubModular valuations

Published 1 Dec 2023 in cs.GT and econ.TH | (2312.00522v1)

Abstract: We show that no efficient ascending auction can guarantee to find even a minimal envy-free price vector if all valuations are submodular, assuming a basic complexity theory's assumption.

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