LoFT: Local Proxy Fine-tuning For Improving Transferability Of Adversarial Attacks Against Large Language Model (2310.04445v2)

Abstract: It has been shown that LLM alignments can be circumvented by appending specially crafted attack suffixes with harmful queries to elicit harmful responses. To conduct attacks against private target models whose characterization is unknown, public models can be used as proxies to fashion the attack, with successful attacks being transferred from public proxies to private target models. The success rate of attack depends on how closely the proxy model approximates the private model. We hypothesize that for attacks to be transferrable, it is sufficient if the proxy can approximate the target model in the neighborhood of the harmful query. Therefore, in this paper, we propose \emph{Local Fine-Tuning (LoFT)}, \textit{i.e.}, fine-tuning proxy models on similar queries that lie in the lexico-semantic neighborhood of harmful queries to decrease the divergence between the proxy and target models. First, we demonstrate three approaches to prompt private target models to obtain similar queries given harmful queries. Next, we obtain data for local fine-tuning by eliciting responses from target models for the generated similar queries. Then, we optimize attack suffixes to generate attack prompts and evaluate the impact of our local fine-tuning on the attack's success rate. Experiments show that local fine-tuning of proxy models improves attack transferability and increases attack success rate by $39\%$, $7\%$, and $0.5\%$ (absolute) on target models ChatGPT, GPT-4, and Claude respectively.