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Internet Localization of Multi-Party Relay Users: Inherent Friction Between Internet Services and User Privacy

Published 8 Jul 2023 in cs.NI | (2307.04009v1)

Abstract: Internet privacy is increasingly important on the modern Internet. Users are looking to control the trail of data that they leave behind on the systems that they interact with. Multi-Party Relay (MPR) architectures lower the traditional barriers to adoption of privacy enhancing technologies on the Internet. MPRs are unique from legacy architectures in that they are able to offer privacy guarantees without paying significant performance penalties. Apple's iCloud Private Relay is a recently deployed MPR service, creating the potential for widespread consumer adoption of the architecture. However, many current Internet-scale systems are designed based on assumptions that may no longer hold for users of privacy enhancing systems like Private Relay. There are inherent tensions between systems that rely on data about users -- estimated location of a user based on their IP address, for example -- and the trend towards a more private Internet. This work studies a core function that is widely used to control network and application behavior, IP geolocation, in the context of iCloud Private Relay usage. We study the location accuracy of popular IP geolocation services compared against the published location dataset that Apple publicly releases to explicitly aid in geolocating PR users. We characterize geolocation service performance across a number of dimensions, including different countries, IP version, infrastructure provider, and time. Our findings lead us to conclude that existing approaches to IP geolocation (e.g., frequently updated databases) perform inadequately for users of the MPR architecture. For example, we find median location errors >1,000 miles in some countries for IPv4 addresses using IP2Location. Our findings lead us to conclude that new, privacy-focused, techniques for inferring user location may be required as privacy becomes a default user expectation on the Internet.

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