Stable Matching with Multilayer Approval Preferences: Approvals can be Harder than Strict Preferences

Abstract: We study stable matching problems where agents have multilayer preferences: There are $\ell$ layers each consisting of one preference relation for each agent. Recently, Chen et al. [EC '18] studied such problems with strict preferences, establishing four multilayer adaptions of classical notions of stability. We follow up on their work by analyzing the computational complexity of stable matching problems with multilayer approval preferences. We consider eleven stability notions derived from three well-established stability notions for stable matchings with ties and the four adaptions proposed by Chen et al. For each stability notion, we show that the problem of finding a stable matching is either polynomial-time solvable or NP-hard. Furthermore, we examine the influence of the number of layers and the desired "degree of stability" on the problems' complexity. Somewhat surprisingly, we discover that assuming approval preferences instead of strict preferences does not considerably simplify the situation (and sometimes even makes polynomial-time solvable problems NP-hard).