Amplitude death in coupled replicator map lattice: averting migration dilemma (2109.11402v1)

Abstract: Populations composed of a collection of subpopulations (demes) with random migration between them are quite common occurrences. The emergence and sustenance of cooperation in such a population is a highly researched topic in the evolutionary game theory. If the individuals in every deme are considered to be either cooperators or defectors, the migration dilemma can be envisaged: The cooperators would not want to migrate to a defector-rich deme as they fear of facing exploitation; but without migration, cooperation can not be established throughout the network of demes. With a view to studying the aforementioned scenario, in this paper, we set up a theoretical model consisting of a coupled map lattice of replicator maps based on two-player--two-strategy games. The replicator map considered is capable of showing a variety of evolutionary outcomes, like convergent (fixed point) outcomes and nonconvergent (periodic and chaotic) outcomes. Furthermore, this coupled network of the replicator maps undergoes the phenomenon of amplitude death leading to non-oscillatory stable synchronized states. We specifically explore the effect of (i) the nature of coupling that models migration between the maps, (ii) the heterogenous demes (in the sense that not all the demes have same game being played by the individuals), (iii) the degree of the network, and (iv) the cost associated with the migration. In the course of investigation, we are intrigued by the effectiveness of the random migration in sustaining a uniform cooperator fraction across a population irrespective of the details of the replicator dynamics and the interaction among the demes.