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A Dynamic Game Approach to Designing Secure Interdependent IoT-Enabled Infrastructure Network

Published 26 Jul 2021 in cs.NI, cs.SY, and eess.SY | (2108.13159v1)

Abstract: The emerging Internet of Things (IoT) applications that leverage ubiquitous connectivity and big data are facilitating the realization of smart everything initiatives. IoT-enabled infrastructures have naturally a multi-layer system architecture with an overlaid or underlaid device network and its coexisting infrastructure network. The connectivity between different components in these two heterogeneous interdependent networks plays an important role in delivering real-time information and ensuring a high-level situational awareness. However, IoT-enabled infrastructures face cyber threats due to the wireless nature of communications. Therefore, maintaining network connectivity in the presence of adversaries is a critical task for infrastructure network operators. In this paper, we establish a three-player three-stage dynamic game-theoretic framework including two network operators and one attacker to capture the secure design of multi-layer interdependent infrastructure networks by allocating limited resources. We use subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE) to characterize the strategies of players with sequential moves. In addition, we assess the efficiency of the equilibrium network by comparing with its team optimal solution counterparts in which two network operators can coordinate. We further design a scalable algorithm to guide the construction of the equilibrium IoT-enabled infrastructure networks. Finally, we use case studies on the emerging paradigm of the Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) to corroborate the obtained results.

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