Conflicts, Assortative Matching, and the Evolution of Signaling Norms

Abstract: This paper proposes a model to explain the potential role of inter-group conflicts in determining the rise and fall of signaling norms. Individuals in a population are characterized by high and low productivity types and they are matched in pairs to form social relationships such as mating or foraging relationships. In each relationship, an individual's payoff is increasing in its own type and its partner's type. Hence, the payoff structure of a relationship does not resemble a dilemma situation. Assume that types are not observable. In one population, assortative matching according to types is sustained by signaling. In the other population, individuals do not signal and they are randomly matched. Types evolve within each population. At the same time, the two populations may engage in conflicts. Due to assortative matching, high types grow faster in the population with signaling, yet they bear the cost of signaling, which lowers their population's fitness in the long run. Through simulations, we show that the survival of the signaling population depends crucially on the timing and the efficiency of weapon used in inter-group conflicts.