Weak Solutions for Potential Mean Field Games of Controls

Abstract: We analyze a system of partial differential equations that model a potential mean field game of controls, briefly MFGC. Such a game describes the interaction of infinitely many negligible players competing to optimize a personal value function that depends in aggregate on the state and, most notably, control choice of all other players. A solution of the system corresponds to a Nash Equilibrium, a group optimal strategy for which no one player can improve by altering only their own action. We investigate the second order, possibly degenerate, case with non-strictly elliptic diffusion operator and local coupling function. The main result exploits potentiality to employ variational techniques to provide a unique weak solution to the system, with additional space and time regularity results under additional assumptions. New analytical subtleties occur in obtaining a priori estimates with the introduction of an additional coupling that depends on the state distribution as well as feedback.