The Efficiency of Best-Response Dynamics

Abstract: Best response (BR) dynamics is a natural method by which players proceed toward a pure Nash equilibrium via a local search method. The quality of the equilibrium reached may depend heavily on the order by which players are chosen to perform their best response moves. A {\em deviator rule} $S$ is a method for selecting the next deviating player. We provide a measure for quantifying the performance of different deviator rules. The {\em inefficiency} of a deviator rule $S$ is the maximum ratio, over all initial profiles $p$, between the social cost of the worst equilibrium reachable by $S$ from $p$ and the social cost of the best equilibrium reachable from $p$. This inefficiency always lies between $1$ and the {\em price of anarchy}. We study the inefficiency of various deviator rules in network formation games and job scheduling games (both are congestion games, where BR dynamics always converges to a pure NE). For some classes of games, we compute optimal deviator rules. Furthermore, we define and study a new class of deviator rules, called {\em local} deviator rules. Such rules choose the next deviator as a function of a restricted set of parameters, and satisfy a natural condition called {\em independence of irrelevant players}. We present upper bounds on the inefficiency of some local deviator rules, and also show that for some classes of games, no local deviator rule can guarantee inefficiency lower than the price of anarchy.