Protocol Proxy: An FTE-based Covert Channel (2002.10687v2)

Abstract: In a hostile network environment, users must communicate without being detected. This involves blending in with the existing traffic. In some cases, a higher degree of secrecy is required. We present a proof-of-concept format transforming encryption (FTE)-based covert channel for tunneling TCP traffic through protected static protocols. Protected static protocols are UDP-based protocols with variable fields that cannot be blocked without collateral damage, such as power grid failures. We (1) convert TCP traffic to UDP traffic, (2) introduce observation-based FTE, and (3) model interpacket timing with a deterministic Hidden Markov Model (HMM). The resulting Protocol Proxy has a very low probability of detection and is an alternative to current covert channels. We tunnel a TCP session through a UDP protocol and guarantee delivery. Observation-based FTE ensures traffic cannot be detected by traditional rule-based analysis or DPI. A deterministic HMM ensures the Protocol Proxy accurately models interpacket timing to avoid detection by side-channel analysis. Finally, the choice of a protected static protocol foils stateful protocol analysis and causes collateral damage with false positives.