Dependency-based targeted attacks in interdependent networks

Abstract: Modern large network systems normally work in cooperation and incorporate dependencies between their components for purposes of efficiency and regulation. Such dependencies may become a major risk since they can cause small scale failures to propagate throughout the system. Thus, the dependent nodes could be a natural target for malicious attacks that aim to exploit these vulnerabilities. Here, we consider for the first time a new type of targeted attacks that are based on the dependency between the networks. We study strategies of attacks that range from dependency-first to dependency-last, where a fraction $1-p$ of the nodes with dependency links, or nodes without dependency links, respectively, are initially attacked. We systematically analyze, both analytically and numerically, the percolation transition of partially interdependent Erd\H{o}s-R\'{e}nyi (ER) networks, where a fraction $q$ of the nodes in each network are dependent upon nodes the other network. We find that for a broad range of dependency strength $q$, dependency-first' strategy, which intuitively is expected to increase the system's vulnerability, actually leads to a more stable system, in terms of lower critical percolation threshold $p_c$, compared with random attacks of the same size. In contrast, thedependency-last' strategy leads to a more vulnerable system, i.e., higher $p_c$, compared with a random attack. By exploring the dynamics of the cascading failures initiated by dependency-based attacks, we explain this counter-intuitive effect. Our results demonstrate that the most vulnerable components in a system of interdependent networks are not necessarily the ones that lead to the maximal immediate impact but those which initiate a cascade of failures with maximal accumulated damage.