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Strategic analysis of implementation assets and threats

Published 15 May 2018 in cs.GT | (1805.06052v1)

Abstract: The aim of the strategic analysis is to (simply) carry out the game between the implementing body and possible links to the existing market situation. We are therefore playing a strategic game between us and the outside world. This situation is most often associated with existing and potential threats, such as competition, fashion trends, cost situation, marketing effectiveness, market demand, etc. However, this does not exhaust all aspects resulting from the situation, as conditions conducive to the implementation may also be taken into account, such as the possibility of cooperation, favourable location, new forms of reaching the recipient, new legal solutions, etc. Generally speaking, we can divide the set of conditions into assets and threats. Playing a strategic game leads not only to the estimation of the game's value but also points to the equilibrium points (saddle points) and to the conditions of market stabilization. We therefore have two players (one zero-sum two-player game depending on the assumptions made); one side is our assets and the other side is external threats. The strategies of both players will be a combination of implementation, market and marketing parameters. This will be described as an example in the introduction (chapter 1). The next chapters (2 and 3) are proposals for estimating the effects of strategy selection, i.e. creating payoffs for players. The final stage will be playing the game, the analysis of its results (chapters 3) and the summary (chapter 4).

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