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Laboratories of Oligarchy? How the Iron Law Extends to Peer Production

Published 30 Jun 2014 in cs.CY and cs.SI | (1407.0323v1)

Abstract: Peer production projects like Wikipedia have inspired voluntary associations, collectives, social movements, and scholars to embrace open online collaboration as a model of democratic organization. However, many peer production projects exhibit entrenched leadership and deep inequalities, suggesting that they may not fulfill democratic ideals. Instead, peer production projects may conform to Robert Michels' "iron law of oligarchy," which proposes that democratic membership organizations become increasingly oligarchic as they grow. Using exhaustive data of internal processes from a sample of 683 wikis, we construct empirical measures of participation and test for increases in oligarchy associated with growth. In contrast to previous studies, we find support for Michels' iron law and conclude that peer production entails oligarchic organizational forms.

Citations (175)

Summary

  • The paper finds that as peer production communities scale, the appointment of new administrators is constrained, concentrating power among a small elite.
  • It reveals that a 1% growth in contributors leads to a 3% rise in administrative actions, indicating intensified control as projects expand.
  • The paper shows that a 1% increase in user accounts results in a 5% rise in administrator reverts, highlighting stricter editorial oversight.

Examination of Oligarchic Tendencies in Peer Production Projects

The paper by Aaron Shaw and Benjamin Mako Hill investigates the application of Robert Michels' "iron law of oligarchy" to large-scale peer production projects, using evidence derived from a substantial dataset encompassing 683 wikis hosted by Wikia. Their research challenges the prevailing notion that such projects commonly promote democratic governance and open collaboration. Instead, the findings suggest a propensity toward oligarchic structures as these projects scale.

Analysis of Oligarchical Dynamics

The authors meticulously dissect Michels' theory, adapting it to the unique dynamics of peer production communities. They distinguish two pivotal components of oligarchy: structural consolidation of authority among a small group of leaders and the transformation of organizational goals to align more closely with these leaders' interests, potentially diverging from the collective. Shaw and Hill's work specifically tests three hypotheses derived from these components.

  1. Administrator Expansion Constraints: The research indicates a diminishing probability of appointing new administrators as the community of contributors expands. A log-unit increase in contributors correlates with only 0.81 times the odds of adding a new administrator, illustrating the concentration of power within an established elite group.
  2. Increased Administrative Activity: Notably, administrators exhibit intensified activity within administrative domains as the wiki grows. Controlling for total administrative edits, a 1% growth in contributor accounts corresponds to a 3% rise in administrative actions.
  3. Editorial Control: Experienced contributors face increased restrictions, with their contributions more frequently reverted as the project grows. A 1% increase in user accounts results in a 5% rise in administrator-reverted contributions, emphasizing the authoritative influence wielded by the administrators over content regulation.

Implications for Peer Production and Collective Intelligence

The implications of the research are multifaceted, impacting the theoretical understanding and practical implementation of peer production systems. Despite their intrinsic openness and the lack of rigid bureaucratic structures, these digital communities tend to evolve into oligarchic systems that mirror Michels' predictions. Such developments raise critical questions regarding the sustainability and democratic integrity of peer production models widely adopted across various platforms and projects.

The findings call for a re-evaluation of strategies in fostering democratic engagement in collaborative online communities. Future research may focus on identifying factors that enable certain wikis to resist oligarchic consolidation, and unravel the societal, technological, or organizational modifications required to sustain and cultivate democratic principles within these systems. The exploration of these dimensions could provide valuable insights into enhancing the governance structures of peer production projects to mitigate entrenched inequality and promote genuine participatory democracy.

This study contributes significantly to the understanding of organizational evolution in peer production environments, highlighting the necessity for ongoing scrutiny and adaptive measures to align their operation with their democratic aspirations.

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