A Theological Argument for an Everett Multiverse

Abstract: Science looks for the simplest hypotheses to explain observations. Starting with the simple assumption that {\em the actual world is the best possible world}, I sketch an {\it Optimal Argument for the Existence of God}, that the sufferings in our universe would not be consistent with its being alone the best possible world, but the total world could be the best possible if it includes an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God who experiences great value in creating and knowing a universe with great mathematical elegance, even though such a universe has suffering. God seems loathe to violate elegant laws of physics that He has chosen to use in His creation, such as Maxwell's equations for electromagnetism or Einstein's equations of general relativity for gravity within their classical domains of applicability, even if their violation could greatly reduce human suffering (e.g., from falls). If indeed God is similarly loathe to violate quantum unitarity (though such violations by judicious collapses of the wavefunction could greatly reduce human suffering by always choosing only favorable outcomes), the resulting unitary evolution would lead to an Everett multiverse of `many worlds', meaning many different quasiclassical histories beyond the quasiclassical history that each of us can observe over his or her lifetime. This is a theological argument for one reason why God might prefer to create a multiverse much broader than what one normally thinks of for a history of the universe.

• The paper argues that an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God's appreciation for elegant physical laws supports the existence of an Everett multiverse.
• It suggests that suffering in our universe is consistent with the "best possible world" if value includes God's aesthetic appreciation for elegant physics, even if it entails suffering.
• The argument posits that God's reluctance to violate elegant physical laws, specifically quantum unitarity, provides a theological basis for the branching structure of the Everett multiverse.

The paper introduces a theological argument suggesting that the existence of an Everett multiverse is consistent with the concept of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God. It posits that the actual world is the "best possible world," implying a maximization of value, specifically the intrinsic value of conscious experiences.

The author addresses the problem of suffering, suggesting that the presence of suffering in our universe is inconsistent with the idea that our universe alone is the best possible world. The author suggests that God's appreciation for mathematical elegance in the laws of physics, such as Maxwell's equations and Einstein's equations of general relativity, contributes significantly to the value of the total world, even if these laws lead to suffering.

The paper uses Bayesian analysis to assess the plausibility of competing theories, weighing them based on prior probabilities and likelihoods. The author notes the subjective nature of assigning prior probabilities and the difficulty of calculating likelihoods for complete theories. The paper argues that neither maximal simplicity nor maximum likelihood alone is plausible for a theory with the maximum posterior probability.

Here is a list of the key points of the paper:

• Optimal Argument for the Existence of God: The paper posits that the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God is plausible if one assumes the actual world is the best possible world. God's appreciation for the mathematical elegance of the universe could outweigh the suffering within it.
• God's Loathness to Violate Physical Laws: God seems hesitant to violate the elegant laws of physics, even if doing so could reduce human suffering. This includes a reluctance to violate quantum unitarity, which leads to the concept of an Everett multiverse.
• Everett Multiverse: The theological argument supports the existence of an Everett multiverse, arising from God's preference for elegant, uncollapsed quantum states. The author suggests that collapsing the quantum state to maximize creaturely happiness would reduce God's own happiness due to the loss of mathematical elegance.
• Critique of Creaturely Free Will: The author questions the plausibility of libertarian creaturely free will, suggesting that God ultimately determines all actions. The paper speculates that human evil may also be a consequence of God's ultimate determination, balanced against the overall value of the world.
• Theological Reasons for an Everett Multiverse: The author concludes that there are philosophical, scientific, and theological reasons supporting the Everett multiverse, emphasizing the reality of different quantum outcomes.

The author argues that even if God could collapse the quantum state in an elegant way, it might not increase the ratio of creaturely happiness to sadness compared to the Everett version. The paper explores the possibility of God collapsing the quantum state on special occasions, such as the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, but suggests that most of the time, God does not collapse the quantum state in a way that has obvious moral significance for creatures within the universe.

In summary, the paper offers a speculative theodicy, suggesting that God's appreciation for elegant laws of physics may be a primary reason for the existence of evil and suffering in the universe. The author proposes that this is the best possible world, with God's design being ultimately for the best, despite the local evils and sufferings that result.