Formal security analysis of the Finlow–Bates hash-based construction

Develop a formal security analysis of the compact two-transaction hash construction proposed by Finlow–Bates et al., including its security under the relevant adversarial and ledger conditions.

Background

The paper discusses a compact two-transaction hash-based authorization construction proposed by Finlow–Bates et al. as an alternative to large post-quantum signatures. That proposal uses a commitment and reveal structure, making its security dependent on the treatment of disclosure, admission, censorship, and the ordering of ledger events.

The paper explicitly notes that the proposal leaves its formal security analysis unresolved. The present paper develops a formal framework for ledger authenticators and analyzes its own commit, close, reveal construction, but does not provide the missing formal analysis of the Finlow–Bates proposal itself.

References

Finlow-Bates et al. propose a compact two transaction hash construction as an alternative to large post-quantum signatures and leave formal security analysis to future work.

— Finality Before Disclosure for Ledger Authenticators in the Quantum Random Oracle Model  (2608.18605 - Lie et al., 19 Aug 2026) in Section 2, paragraph “Temporal authentication and ledger reveal protocols”