Equilibrium analysis of the endogenous common-noise discovery tree
Solve the common-noise mean field game in which a public capability ladder evolves through endogenous discovery jumps whose intensity depends on the searching population, including the forward equilibrium problem over discovery histories when the collective-remedy coupling is nonzero.
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We do not solve that tree.
What that machinery does not yet have, to our knowledge, is a major player whose influence is the arrival of an irreversible public breakthrough that shifts the minor agents' stopping boundary --- the object this episode calls for --- and building it is the natural next paper rather than a paragraph in this one. Whether the collective misbehavior of AI agents is generally of this producer--consumer form, and whether even the response tier is exchangeable once assignment links are accounted for (\S\ref{sec:why}), are the two empirical questions this record leaves open; together with the major--minor formulation they are the most valuable things it offers the mean field community that we leave to future research.