Spatial public goods games on any population structure (2411.00398v1)

Abstract: Understanding the emergence of cooperation in spatially structured populations has advanced significantly in the context of pairwise games, but the fundamental theory of group-based public goods games (PGGs) remains less explored. Here, we provide theoretical conditions under which cooperation thrive in spatial PGGs on any population structure, which are accurate under weak selection. We find that PGGs can support cooperation across all kinds of model details and on almost all network structures in contrast to pairwise games. For example, a class of networks that would otherwise fail to produce cooperation, such as star graphs, are particularly conducive to cooperation in spatial PGGs. This fundamental advantage of spatial PGGs derives from reciprocity through second-order interactions, allowing local structures such as the clustering coefficient to play positive roles. We also verify the robustness of spatial PGGs on empirical networks where pairwise games cannot support cooperation, which implies that PGGs could be a universal interaction mode in real-world systems.