Principal-Agent Multitasking: the Uniformity of Optimal Contracts and its Efficient Learning via Instrumental Regression (2405.20642v1)

Abstract: This work studies the multitasking principal-agent problem. I first show a uniformity'' result. Specifically, when the tasks are perfect substitutes, and the agent's cost function is homogeneous to a certain degree, then the optimal contract only depends on the marginal utility of each task and the degree of homogeneity. I then study a setting where the marginal utility of each task is unknown so that the optimal contract must be learned or estimated with observational data. I identify this problem as a regression problem with measurement errors and observe that this problem can be cast as an instrumental regression problem. The current works observe that both the contract and the repeated observations (when available) can act as valid instrumental variables, and propose using the generalized method of moments estimator to compute an approximately optimal contract from offline data. I also study an online setting and show how the optimal contract can be efficiently learned in an online fashion using the two estimators. Here the principal faces an exploration-exploitation tradeoff: she must experiment with new contracts and observe their outcome whilst at the same time ensuring her experimentations are not deviating too much from the optimal contract. This work shows when repeated observations are available and agents are sufficientlydiverse", the principal can achieve a very low $\widetilde{O}(d)$ cumulative utility loss, even with a ``pure exploitation" algorithm.