Distributed Stackelberg Equilibrium Seeking for Networked Multi-Leader Multi-Follower Games with A Clustered Information Structure

Abstract: The Stackelberg game depicts a leader-follower relationship wherein decisions are made sequentially, and the Stackelberg equilibrium represents an expected optimal solution when the leader can anticipate the rational response of the follower. Motivated by control of network systems with two levels of decision-making hierarchy, such as the management of energy networks and power coordination at cellular networks, a networked multi-leaders and multi-followers Stackelberg game is proposed. Due to the constraint of limited information interaction among players, a clustered information structure is assumed that each leader can only communicate with a portion of overall followers, namely its subordinated followers, and also only with its local neighboring leaders. In this case, the leaders cannot fully anticipate the collective rational response of all followers with its local information. To address Stackelberg equilibrium seeking under this partial information structure, we propose a distributed seeking algorithm based on implicit gradient estimation and network consensus mechanisms. We rigorously prove the convergence of the algorithm for both diminishing and constant step sizes under strict and strong monotonicity conditions, respectively. Furthermore, the model and the algorithm can also incorporate linear equality and inequality constraints into the followers' optimization problems, with the approach of the interior point barrier function. Finally, we present numerical simulations in applications to corroborate our claims on the proposed framework.