A Data-Driven Safety Preserving Control Architecture for Constrained Cyber-Physical Systems (2312.00658v2)

Abstract: In this paper, we propose a data-driven networked control architecture for unknown and constrained cyber-physical systems capable of detecting networked false-data-injection attacks and ensuring plant's safety. In particular, on the controller's side, we design a novel robust anomaly detector that can discover the presence of network attacks using a data-driven outer approximation of the expected robust one-step reachable set. On the other hand, on the plant's side, we design a data-driven safety verification module, which resorts to worst-case arguments to determine if the received control input is safe for the plant's evolution. Whenever necessary, the same module is in charge of replacing the networked controller with a local data-driven set-theoretic model predictive controller, whose objective is to keep the plant's trajectory in a pre-established safe configuration until an attack-free condition is recovered. Numerical simulations involving a two-tank water system illustrate the features and capabilities of the proposed control architecture.