Information-based matching explains the diversity of cooperation among different populations

Abstract: This paper introduces a bilateral matching mechanism to explain why different populations have different levels of cooperation. The traditional game theory assumes that individuals can acquire their neighbor's information without cost after generating information. In fact, the environment and cognition of populations often limit the magnitude of information received by individuals. Our model divides information dynamics into two processes: generation and dissemination. After generating, information starts to disseminate in the population. Individuals match and interact with each other based on the information received and then confirm partnerships, which differs from traditional research's unilateral partner selection process. Specifically, we find a function to simulate two constraints of information acquisition in different populations: information dissemination cost and cognition competence. These two kinds of constraints affect the choice of partnership and then the evolution of cooperation. The game evolved under the condition of information constraints. Through large-scale Monte Carlo simulations, we find that information dissemination and cognition underlie the evolution of cooperation. The lower cost of information dissemination and the more valid cognition of information, the higher level of cooperation. Moreover, deviations in cognition among individuals more sensitively determine the equilibrium cooperation density. As the deviations increase, cooperation density decreases significantly. This paper provides a new explanation for the diversity of cooperation among populations with different information dissemination costs and cognition competence.