Robust double auction mechanisms (2102.00669v3)

Abstract: We study the robust double auction mechanisms, that is, the double auction mechanisms that satisfy dominant strategy incentive compatibility, ex-post individual rationality and ex-post budget balance. We first establish that the price in any robust mechanism does not depend on the valuations of the trading players. We next establish that, with a non-bossiness assumption, the price in any robust mechanism does not depend on players' valuations at all, whether trading or non-trading. Our main result is the characterization result that, with a non-bossy assumption along with other assumptions on the properties of the mechanism, the generalized posted mechanism in which a constant price is posted for each possible set of traders is the only robust double auction mechanism. We also show that, even without the non-bossiness assumption, it is quite difficult to find a reasonable robust double auction mechanism other than the generalized posted price mechanism.