Compensation of Charging Station Overload via On-road Mobile Energy Storage Scheduling

Abstract: Supported by the technical development of electric battery and charging facilities, plug-in electric vehicle (PEV) has the potential to be mobile energy storage (MES) for energy delivery from resourceful charging stations (RCSs) to limited-capacity charging stations (LCSs). In this paper, we study the problem of using on-road PEVs as MESs for energy compensation service to compensate charging station (CS) overload. A price-incentive scheme is proposed for power system operator (PSO) to stimulate on-road MESs fulfilling energy compensation tasks. The price-service interaction between the PSO and MESs is characterized as a one-leader, multiple-follower Stackelberg game. The PSO acts as a leader to schedule on-road MESs by posting service price and on-road MESs respond to the price by choosing their service amount. The existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium are validated, and an algorithm is developed to find the equilibrium. Simulation results show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme in utility optimization and overload mitigation.