Papers
Topics
Authors
Recent
Search
2000 character limit reached

Safe Privatization in Transactional Memory

Published 12 Jan 2018 in cs.DC | (1801.04249v1)

Abstract: Transactional memory (TM) facilitates the development of concurrent applications by letting the programmer designate certain code blocks as atomic. Programmers using a TM often would like to access the same data both inside and outside transactions, e.g., to improve performance or to support legacy code. In this case, programmers would ideally like the TM to guarantee strong atomicity, where transactions can be viewed as executing atomically also with respect to non-transactional accesses. Since guaranteeing strong atomicity for arbitrary programs is prohibitively expensive, researchers have suggested guaranteeing it only for certain data-race free (DRF) programs, particularly those that follow the privatization idiom: from some point on, threads agree that a given object can be accessed non-transactionally. Supporting privatization safely in a TM is nontrivial, because this often requires correctly inserting transactional fences, which wait until all active transactions complete. Unfortunately, there is currently no consensus on a single definition of transactional DRF, in particular, because no existing notion of DRF takes into account transactional fences. In this paper we propose such a notion and prove that, if a TM satisfies a certain condition generalizing opacity and a program using it is DRF assuming strong atomicity, then the program indeed has strongly atomic semantics. We show that our DRF notion allows the programmer to use privatization idioms. We also propose a method for proving our generalization of opacity and apply it to the TL2 TM.

Citations (10)

Summary

Paper to Video (Beta)

Whiteboard

No one has generated a whiteboard explanation for this paper yet.

Open Problems

We haven't generated a list of open problems mentioned in this paper yet.

Continue Learning

We haven't generated follow-up questions for this paper yet.

Collections

Sign up for free to add this paper to one or more collections.