Small games and long memories promote cooperation

Abstract: Complex social behaviors lie at the heart of many of the challenges facing evolutionary biology, sociology, economics, and beyond. For evolutionary biologists in particular the question is often how such behaviors can arise \textit{de novo} in a simple evolving system. How can group behaviors such as collective action, or decision making that accounts for memories of past experience, emerge and persist? Evolutionary game theory provides a framework for formalizing these questions and admitting them to rigorous study. Here we develop such a framework to study the evolution of sustained collective action in multi-player public-goods games, in which players have arbitrarily long memories of prior rounds of play and can react to their experience in an arbitrary way. To study this problem we construct a coordinate system for memory-$m$ strategies in iterated $n$-player games that permits us to characterize all the cooperative strategies that resist invasion by any mutant strategy, and thus stabilize cooperative behavior. We show that while larger games inevitably make cooperation harder to evolve, there nevertheless always exists a positive volume of strategies that stabilize cooperation provided the population size is large enough. We also show that, when games are small, longer-memory strategies make cooperation easier to evolve, by increasing the number of ways to stabilize cooperation. Finally we explore the co-evolution of behavior and memory capacity, and we find that longer-memory strategies tend to evolve in small games, which in turn drives the evolution of cooperation even when the benefits for cooperation are low.