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Shamir-Based HSS for Monomials

Updated 8 December 2025
  • The paper introduces a Shamir-based homomorphic secret sharing scheme for monomials that achieves perfect context-hiding and secure multi-party computation over a prime field.
  • The methodology leverages polynomial share generation, local homomorphic evaluation at servers, and Lagrange interpolation for accurate output reconstruction.
  • The scheme balances privacy with communication efficiency by meeting parameter constraints, enabling secure evaluation of monomials in MPC frameworks.

Shamir-based homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) for monomials is a secret-sharing scheme that enables secure multi-party computation over a prime field $\F_p$ by distributing shares of individual client inputs among mm servers. Each server computes a homomorphic evaluation of a monomial function over its received shares, enabling reconstruction of the functional output and achieving a strong privacy guarantee: the output shares reveal no more information about the private inputs than the output value itself. At the heart of this privacy is the context-hiding property, which ensures indistinguishability of output-share distributions for input tuples yielding the same function output.

1. Scheme Definition and Preliminaries

The scheme is instantiated for an arbitrary monomial f(x1,,xn)=x1e1x2e2xnenf(x_1,\dots,x_n)=x_1^{e_1}x_2^{e_2}\dots x_n^{e_n}, specialized from the general Shamir-HSS protocols of Ishai–Lai–Malavolta [ILM21] and Fosli–Ishai–Kolobov–Wootters [FIKW22], as detailed in (Feng et al., 1 Dec 2025). It operates over the field $\F_p$, with tt denoting the privacy threshold such that up to tt colluding servers learn nothing about the inputs, and mm the number of servers, subject to m>tieim>t\sum_i e_i for successful output reconstruction.

Three algorithms define the scheme:

  • $\Gen(x_1,\dots,x_n)$: For each client ii, sample a random Shamir polynomial φi(u)=xi+ri,1u++ri,tut\varphi_i(u) = x_i + r_{i,1}u + \dots + r_{i,t}u^t, $r_{i,u}\in\F_p$. For each server jj, compute shares si,j=φi(αj)s_{i,j} = \varphi_i(\alpha_j).
  • $\Eval(j,f,\mathbf{s}_j)$: Server jj locally computes $y_j = \prod_{i=1}^n (s_{i,j})^{e_i}\in\F_p$.
  • $\Rec((y_1,\dots,y_m))$: View g(u)=i=1nφi(u)eig(u)=\prod_{i=1}^n \varphi_i(u)^{e_i}, interpolate g(0)=f(x1,,xn)g(0)=f(x_1,\dots,x_n) from (αj,yj)(\alpha_j,y_j) using Lagrange interpolation with basis coefficients j=kjαkαkαj\ell_j=\prod_{k\neq j} \frac{\alpha_k}{\alpha_k-\alpha_j}.

2. Share Generation, Homomorphic Evaluation, and Reconstruction

Input sharing follows the classic Shamir secret sharing paradigm, generating polynomials pi(u)=xi+u=1tri,uuup_i(u)=x_i+\sum_{u=1}^t r_{i,u}u^u. Server jj receives the tuple (s1,j,,sn,j)(s_{1,j},\dots,s_{n,j}).

Homomorphic evaluation is performed locally: yj=i=1npi(αj)ei=g(αj),y_j = \prod_{i=1}^n p_i(\alpha_j)^{e_i} = g(\alpha_j), where g(u)g(u) has total degree at most ieit\sum_i e_i t, permitting output reconstruction if m>ieitm>\sum_i e_i t.

Final reconstruction uses the set {(αj,yj)}j=1m\{(\alpha_j,y_j)\}_{j=1}^m: f(x1,,xn)=g(0)=j=1myjj,f(x_1,\dots,x_n) = g(0) = \sum_{j=1}^m y_j \ell_j, recovering the functional output with perfect completeness.

Step Input Output
Share Generation $x_i\in\F_p$ si,j=pi(αj)s_{i,j}=p_i(\alpha_j)
Homomorphic Eval si,js_{i,j} yj=isi,jeiy_j=\prod_i s_{i,j}^{e_i}
Reconstruction (yj)(y_j) f(x1,,xn)f(x_1,\dots,x_n)

3. Context-Hiding Property and Formal Definition

Context-hiding requires that output shares (y1,,ym)(y_1,\dots,y_m) for two distinct input tuples x(0)x(1)\mathbf{x}^{(0)} \neq \mathbf{x}^{(1)} yielding the same function output, f(x(0))=f(x(1))f(\mathbf{x}^{(0)})=f(\mathbf{x}^{(1)}), are identically distributed. As formalized (adapted from Definition 4 in (Feng et al., 1 Dec 2025)), perfect context-hiding for ff means indistinguishability of output-share distributions when the function outputs coincide.

4. Characterization and Proof of Context-Hiding

Rigorous characterization is provided in Theorems 5 and 6 of (Feng et al., 1 Dec 2025):

  • For n=1n=1, i.e., f(x)=xdf(x)=x^d on $\F_p$, the scheme is perfectly context-hiding.
  • For n2n\ge2, restricting inputs to $(\F_p^*)^n$ (i.e., each xi0x_i\neq0), the scheme remains perfectly context-hiding.

The proof utilizes the scaling property: given two input tuples $\mathbf{x}^{(0)},\mathbf{x}^{(1)}\in (\F_p^*)^n$ with equal f()f(\cdot), there exist scalars $c_i\in\F_p^*$ such that xi(1)=cixi(0)x_i^{(1)}=c_i x_i^{(0)}, with iciei=1\prod_i c_i^{e_i}=1. Corresponding Shamir polynomials are set such that ri,u(1)=ciri,u(0)r_{i,u}^{(1)}=c_i r_{i,u}^{(0)}, yielding pi(1)(u)=cipi(0)(u)p_i^{(1)}(u)=c_i p_i^{(0)}(u) and recursively yj(1)=yj(0)y_j^{(1)}=y_j^{(0)}. Thus, the output-share joint distributions are identical, confirming zero advantage for any distinguisher.

5. Communication Complexity and Trade-offs

The scheme's communication properties are dictated by parameters nn, mm, and tt, as follows:

  • Upload (input-share): Each of nn clients sends one field element to each of the mm servers, for a total of nmnm elements (rate 1/m\approx 1/m).
  • Download (output-share): Each server sends one field element (mm elements total, 1/m\approx 1/m rate).
  • The degree tt sets the privacy threshold: higher tt increases polynomial degree, raising minimal mm as m>tieim>t\sum_i e_i.

Privacy and performance trade-off: to tolerate larger tt or evaluate higher-degree monomials, mm must increase, raising communication overhead but preserving information-theoretic security guarantees.

6. Example Instantiation

Consider n=2n=2, f(x1,x2)=x12x23f(x_1,x_2)=x_1^2x_2^3, t=1t=1, hence ei=5\sum e_i=5 and select m7m\ge7. The process is:

  • Client $1$: p1(u)=x1+r1,1up_1(u) = x_1 + r_{1,1}u
  • Client $2$: p2(u)=x2+r2,1up_2(u) = x_2 + r_{2,1}u
  • Server jj receives (s1,j,s2,j)=(p1(j),p2(j))(s_{1,j},s_{2,j})=(p_1(j),p_2(j)), computes yj=p1(j)2p2(j)3y_j = p_1(j)^2 p_2(j)^3
  • The combiner calculates f(x1,x2)=j=17yjkjkkjf(x_1,x_2)=\sum_{j=1}^7 y_j \prod_{k\neq j}\frac{k}{k-j}

Context-hiding is preserved if input pairs (x1(0),x2(0))(x1(1),x2(1))(x_1^{(0)},x_2^{(0)})\neq(x_1^{(1)},x_2^{(1)}) satisfying (x1(0))2(x2(0))3=(x1(1))2(x2(1))3(x_1^{(0)})^2(x_2^{(0)})^3 = (x_1^{(1)})^2(x_2^{(1)})^3 induce the same distribution of (y1,,y7)(y_1,\dots,y_7).

7. Significance, Implications, and Extensions

Shamir-based HSS for monomials provides information-theoretic privacy and supports perfect context hiding under suitable parameterizations. Its applicability extends to secure multi-party computation for functions represented as monomials (and more generally polynomials, as discussed in (Feng et al., 1 Dec 2025)). The scheme's rigorous context-hiding guarantee is achieved without rerandomization, thus optimizing share size and communication complexity versus previous techniques.

A plausible implication is the extension to arbitrary polynomials and the broader deployment of such context-hiding HSS approaches in MPC frameworks, leveraging the strict privacy bounds and efficient evaluation characteristic of Shamir-based structures.

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