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NTRU-GKP Cryptosystem: Quantum-Resilient Encryption

Updated 19 April 2026
  • NTRU-GKP cryptosystem is a public-key protocol that combines NTRU encryption with Gottesman-Kitaev-Preskill (GKP) bosonic quantum error correction.
  • It establishes an equivalence between syndrome decoding in GKP codes and NTRU decryption, achieving constant code rate and optimal distance scaling (Δ ∝ √n).
  • Decoding leverages an efficient trapdoor via Babai’s nearest-plane method, ensuring post-quantum security based on the hardness of inverting NTRU.

The NTRU-GKP cryptosystem is a public-key quantum communication protocol that merges the security of the NTRU cryptosystem with the bosonic quantum error correction capabilities of Gottesman-Kitaev-Preskill (GKP) codes. This construction establishes a direct equivalence between syndrome decoding in a class of GKP codes and decrypting the NTRU cryptosystem, thereby linking quantum error correction with post-quantum cryptography. The NTRU-GKP codes achieve constant rate and average minimum distance scaling as Δn\Delta \propto \sqrt{n} with high probability, paralleling the optimal scaling of concatenated GKP qubit codes. Every random instance of an NTRU-GKP code features an efficient decoder derived from the NTRU trapdoor, with public-key security inherited from the computational hardness conjectures underlying NTRU (Conrad et al., 2023).

1. Code Construction and Formal Specification

The NTRU-GKP cryptosystem is parameterized by the ring/lattice dimension nn, modulus polynomials Φ(x)\Phi(x) (typically xn1x^n - 1 or xn+1x^n + 1), a large modulus qq, a small plaintext modulus pqp \ll q, and trapdoor weight dn/3d \approx n/3. The construction begins in the ring R=Z[x]/Φ(x)R = \mathbb{Z}[x]/\Phi(x).

Key Generation:

  • Sample "small" polynomials f~,g~D(d,d)\tilde{f}, \tilde{g} \leftarrow D(d, d) in nn0 with nn1 coefficients nn2, nn3 coefficients nn4.
  • Form secret key polynomials as nn5, nn6, ensuring nn7 and nn8.
  • Compute the public key nn9 in Φ(x)\Phi(x)0.

Lattice Embedding:

Define the circulant embedding Φ(x)\Phi(x)1, mapping Φ(x)\Phi(x)2 to its circulant matrix. The public NTRU lattice in Φ(x)\Phi(x)3 is generated by

Φ(x)\Phi(x)4

with Φ(x)\Phi(x)5. The set of short vectors in this lattice encodes the NTRU secret.

Symplectic (GKP) Basis and Code Lattice:

A Φ(x)\Phi(x)6-symplectic generator Φ(x)\Phi(x)7 (i.e., Φ(x)\Phi(x)8 for Φ(x)\Phi(x)9) is constructed by rotating the public basis: xn1x^n - 10 where xn1x^n - 11 is the anti-diagonal permutation. Choosing an integer scaling xn1x^n - 12 (often xn1x^n - 13), the GKP code lattice is

xn1x^n - 14

and its stabilizer group is generated by the xn1x^n - 15 displacement operators corresponding to the rows of xn1x^n - 16.

2. Encoding, Quantum Encryption, and Decoding

Encoding (Quantum Encryption):

A logical GKP code state xn1x^n - 17 is any simultaneous xn1x^n - 18 eigenstate of the code's stabilizer operators. To encrypt xn1x^n - 19 under Gaussian shift noise, a sender selects random elements xn+1x^n + 10 and applies the displacement

xn+1x^n + 11

The resulting displacement, in xn+1x^n + 12 split, yields xn+1x^n + 13, which precisely corresponds to NTRU encryption in syndrome form. The displaced codeword xn+1x^n + 14 is transmitted.

Decoding (Quantum Decryption):

The receiver measures the xn+1x^n + 15 stabilizers, correcting the trivial hypercubic GKP syndrome, and computes the residual error syndrome

xn+1x^n + 16

where the phase-space shift is xn+1x^n + 17. Standard NTRU decryption recovers xn+1x^n + 18 as xn+1x^n + 19: qq0 The correct shift qq1 is subtracted, returning to the code space.

3. Code Parameters and ‘Goodness’

qq2

For qq3, qq4, and trapdoor weight qq5, a random NTRU lattice yields a GKP code with qq6 encoded qubits and qq7, matching the scaling of "good" codes (Conrad et al., 2023). Proposition 1 asserts

qq8

for random NTRU lattices, ensuring distance-optimality for qq9. The code achieves constant rate and optimal distance scaling, satisfying the definition of a "good" GKP code.

4. Decoding and Computational Hardness

Minimum-energy decoding (MED) for GKP codes reduces to the closest vector problem (CVP) on the dual stabilizer lattice, which, in the NTRU-GKP setting, is the secret NTRU lattice: pqp \ll q0 Bounded-distance decoding (BDD) with a trapdoor (the secret key) is efficiently solved via Babai’s nearest-plane method. Without the trapdoor, BDD is as hard as NTRU decryption—inverting the public key pqp \ll q1—which underpins the post-quantum security of the cryptosystem. Lemma (eMLD pqp \ll q2 MED): access to the theta-function-based maximum likelihood decoder for GKP codes decodes CVP exactly. Thus, decoding under Gaussian noise is computationally equivalent to NTRU decryption, and decoding GKP codes under this construction is generally pqp \ll q3-hard (Conrad et al., 2023).

5. Public-Key Quantum Communication Protocol

The protocol yields a "quantum one-time pad" realized in a public-key setting:

  1. The recipient generates pqp \ll q4, publishes pqp \ll q5, keeps pqp \ll q6 secret.
  2. The sender prepares a GKP code state pqp \ll q7, samples random NTRU encryption pqp \ll q8, applies pqp \ll q9 with dn/3d \approx n/30, and transmits dn/3d \approx n/31.
  3. The recipient measures syndromes and decodes using dn/3d \approx n/32, undoing dn/3d \approx n/33 to recover dn/3d \approx n/34.

Any eavesdropper must solve NTRU decoding or CVP on dn/3d \approx n/35 to remove the encryption displacement, which is infeasible under the average-case hardness assumption for NTRU (including average-case hardness of factoring dn/3d \approx n/36, ring-LWE in cyclotomics, and quantum hardness of CVP).

6. Theoretical Results and Security Reductions

  • Proposition 1 (Goodness of NTRU–GKP): For dn/3d \approx n/37, dn/3d \approx n/38, dn/3d \approx n/39, random NTRU lattices yield a GKP code with R=Z[x]/Φ(x)R = \mathbb{Z}[x]/\Phi(x)0, achieving R=Z[x]/Φ(x)R = \mathbb{Z}[x]/\Phi(x)1—thus, R=Z[x]/Φ(x)R = \mathbb{Z}[x]/\Phi(x)2 for R=Z[x]/Φ(x)R = \mathbb{Z}[x]/\Phi(x)3.
  • Conjecture 2–3: Random public keys R=Z[x]/Φ(x)R = \mathbb{Z}[x]/\Phi(x)4 produce good GKP codes with high probability, for both R=Z[x]/Φ(x)R = \mathbb{Z}[x]/\Phi(x)5 and R=Z[x]/Φ(x)R = \mathbb{Z}[x]/\Phi(x)6 (Stehlé-Steinfeld variant).
  • Lemmas: MED, eMLD, and CVP decoding for GKP are computationally equivalent; decoding the Construction-A GKP code is equivalent to decoding the underlying qubit code.

The construction embeds the trapdoor-hardness of NTRU polynomial factorization and public-key structure directly into the phase-space lattice of a GKP code. This provides a unified framework for bosonic quantum error correction and post-quantum cryptography, with a public-key quantum channel whose security derives from quantum-hard NTRU assumptions (Conrad et al., 2023).

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