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Tokenized Signatures in Quantum Cryptography

Updated 15 November 2025
  • Tokenized signatures are protocols that generate a one-time quantum token linked to classical keys, ensuring unclonability and secure delegation.
  • They leverage hidden subspace techniques and quantum measurements to achieve revocability, testability, and everlasting security against forgery.
  • Applications range from secure access control and offline key management to converting quantum tokens into classical signatures through collision-resistant hashes.

A tokenized signature scheme in quantum cryptography is a protocol that combines the informational unclonability of quantum states with standard cryptographic notions of signatures, yielding a fully public-key, one-time-use quantum token that enables the bearer to sign a single message. The token is consumed upon use, resulting in a classical signature verifiable via a known public key. The underlying construction draws inspiration from quantum money, particularly the Aaronson–Christiano hidden-subspace scheme, and extends it to practical digital signatures with additional functionalities such as revocability and testability. Tokenized signatures thus allow cryptographically secure delegation of signing authority with intrinsic copy-resistance and significant flexibility.

1. Formal Definition and Syntax

A tokenized signature scheme (TS) consists of the following quantum-capable algorithms:

  • KeyGen: (kpk,ksk)KeyGen(1κ)(k_{pk}, k_{sk}) \gets \mathsf{KeyGen}(1^\kappa) generates a public and secret key pair given security parameter κ\kappa.
  • TokGen: τTokGen(ksk)\tau \gets \mathsf{TokGen}(k_{sk}) creates a fresh, unclonable quantum signing token τ\tau using the secret key.
  • Sign: σSign(α,τ)\sigma \gets \mathsf{Sign}(\alpha, \tau) consumes the quantum token τ\tau to sign a classical message α\alpha, yielding a classical signature σ\sigma. The quantum state is irrecoverably destroyed.
  • Verify: b=Verify(kpk,α,σ)b = \mathsf{Verify}(k_{pk}, \alpha, \sigma) is a classical algorithm that checks signature validity using only the public key.

Correctness requires Pr[σ ⁣ ⁣Sign(α,τ):Verify(kpk,α,σ)=1]=1\Pr[\sigma\!\gets\!\mathsf{Sign}(\alpha,\tau):\mathsf{Verify}(k_{pk},\alpha,\sigma)=1] = 1 for freshly minted τ\tau. Unforgeability guarantees that a quantum polynomial-time (QPT) adversary, given \ell tokens, cannot sign more than \ell distinct messages except with negligible probability.

2. Core Construction: The Hidden-Subspace One-Bit Scheme

The base construction employs the Aaronson–Christiano hidden-subspace approach, originally devised for quantum money:

  • Choose a random subspace AF2nA \leq \mathbb{F}_2^n such that dim(A)=n/2\dim(A) = n/2.
  • The quantum signing token is A=1AaAa|A\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{|A|}} \sum_{a \in A} |a\rangle.
  • Public key: an obfuscated subspace membership predicate for both AA and its dual AA^\perp:

χA(p,x)={1p=0  xA, 1p=1  xA, 0otherwise\chi_{A^*}(p, x) = \begin{cases} 1 & p = 0\ \wedge\ x \in A, \ 1 & p = 1\ \wedge\ x \in A^\perp, \ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}

  • Signing: To sign bit α\alpha:
    • If α=0\alpha=0, measure A|A\rangle in the computational basis: output aAa \in A.
    • If α=1\alpha=1, apply Hadamard gates (HnH^{\otimes n}) to get A|A^\perp\rangle; measure to output bAb \in A^\perp.
    • Output σ=a\sigma = a or bb (unless the all-zero vector, which is forbidden).
  • Verification: Accept if χA(α,σ)=1\chi_{A^*}(\alpha, \sigma) = 1 and σ0n\sigma \neq 0^n.

This protocol is information-theoretically correct and achieves strong unclonability: no QPT adversary can extract more than a single valid signature per token.

3. Lifting to Full Digital Signatures

Three standard steps generalize the scheme:

  1. One-Bit to rr-Bit One-Time: Run multiple one-bit schemes in parallel for message blocks.
  2. Hash-and-Sign: Use a quantum-secure collision-resistant hash function h:{0,1}{0,1}rh: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^r so that only hashes of messages are ever signed, ensuring collision-freeness reduces to unforgeability.
  3. Amplify One-Time to Many-Use: Combine with a standard classical EUF-CMA digital signature (or symmetric MAC). Each signing uses a fresh quantum token; the package includes a classical signature of the token’s public key.

The result is a full-fledged, many-use signature system: any message can be signed (once per token), and the system inherits the unclonability and information-theoretic properties from the quantum primitive.

4. Security Arguments and Properties

4.1 Unforgeability via Quantum Money Lower Bounds

The adversary’s task reduces to finding both a nontrivial member of AA and AA^\perp from a single token—provably hard in the black-box oracle model. Theorems from Aaronson–Christiano and subsequent generalizations yield the following quantum lower bound:

T=Ω(ϵ 2n/4)T = \Omega(\sqrt{\epsilon}\ 2^{n/4})

queries are needed to output both signatures with success probability ϵ\epsilon, which is infeasible for moderate nn (n200n \approx 200 suffices).

With a virtual-black-box (VBB) obfuscator for subspace-membership predicates, the same argument applies in practice: access to the public key does not materially aid the adversary except for negligible terms.

4.2 Revocability and Testability

Revocability:

The protocol allows status checking (was a token spent?) via the following:

  • Randomly select a message, attempt to sign using τ\tau, and verify. Fresh tokens accept with high probability. Spent tokens (post-measurement) cannot pass the test, except with negligible probability.

Testability:

Given read-only access, one may test token validity (without signing) by projective measurement. Any valid τ\tau will pass, while adversarial states or spent tokens will fail except with negligible probability.

Everlasting Revocability:

Even a computationally unbounded adversary cannot, after measurement, produce more than one valid signature or evade revocation, establishing “everlasting” security.

4.3 Theorems

Some critical formal results (as in the referenced work):

  • Unforgeability (Theorem 3.1, 3.6, 4.1.3): No QPT adversary given \ell tokens can sign on +1\ell+1 distinct messages.
  • Revocability (Theorem 3.2): Every unforgeable TS is revocable.
  • Testability (Theorem 3.3): Any testable TS gives a public quantum money scheme.
  • Everlasting Security: The one-bit hidden-subspace TS is information-theoretically one-time and everlasting-revocable.

5. Applications and Extensions

Applications arise in scenarios demanding non-repudiation and controlled delegation without exposing persistent keys:

  • Access Control: Provide limited signing rights (e.g., for financial transactions) where each action consumes a quantum token.
  • Online/Offline Key Management: Keep master keys offline; use tokens for controlled online signature issuance.
  • Byzantine Consensus: Strong guarantees against equivocation in distributed protocols.
  • Quantum Money and Cash-Out Mechanisms: A testable TS gives rise to a public-key quantum money scheme, and any token can be “cashed out” into a classical signed check by destroying the quantum token and creating a public signature.

Notably, the TS framework enables secure, auditable conversion of quantum “bills” into classical payment instruments—a practical bridge for quantum-secure commerce.

6. Practical Considerations, Limitations, and Open Questions

A TS construction depends on:

  • The existence and efficiency of obfuscators for vector subspace membership. Standard models rely on VBB, though indistinguishability obfuscation may suffice.
  • Quantum state coherence: tokens must survive real transmission and storage constraints.
  • Fault tolerance: handling noisy or lossy quantum memories is an ongoing research direction.

Open questions include practical instantiation of required obfuscators under realistic assumptions, generalization to tokenized blind/ring signatures, and robustness under noise.

7. Summary Table

Property Achieved in TS Scheme Caveat/Condition
Correctness Yes: perfect for fresh token Requires no overuse
Unforgeability Information-theoretic in black-box/VBB settings Efficient obfuscator needed
Revocability Yes: public test, no secret key
Testability Yes: projective measurement of fresh state Requires oracles or obfuscated pk
Everlasting Security Yes: unbounded attacker cannot forge after spending

The tokenized signature framework merges quantum money’s unclonability with classical signature semantics, yielding a cryptographically robust and versatile primitive for future quantum networks and secure delegated signing.

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