Tokenized Signatures in Quantum Cryptography
- Tokenized signatures are protocols that generate a one-time quantum token linked to classical keys, ensuring unclonability and secure delegation.
- They leverage hidden subspace techniques and quantum measurements to achieve revocability, testability, and everlasting security against forgery.
- Applications range from secure access control and offline key management to converting quantum tokens into classical signatures through collision-resistant hashes.
A tokenized signature scheme in quantum cryptography is a protocol that combines the informational unclonability of quantum states with standard cryptographic notions of signatures, yielding a fully public-key, one-time-use quantum token that enables the bearer to sign a single message. The token is consumed upon use, resulting in a classical signature verifiable via a known public key. The underlying construction draws inspiration from quantum money, particularly the Aaronson–Christiano hidden-subspace scheme, and extends it to practical digital signatures with additional functionalities such as revocability and testability. Tokenized signatures thus allow cryptographically secure delegation of signing authority with intrinsic copy-resistance and significant flexibility.
1. Formal Definition and Syntax
A tokenized signature scheme (TS) consists of the following quantum-capable algorithms:
- KeyGen: generates a public and secret key pair given security parameter .
- TokGen: creates a fresh, unclonable quantum signing token using the secret key.
- Sign: consumes the quantum token to sign a classical message , yielding a classical signature . The quantum state is irrecoverably destroyed.
- Verify: is a classical algorithm that checks signature validity using only the public key.
Correctness requires for freshly minted . Unforgeability guarantees that a quantum polynomial-time (QPT) adversary, given tokens, cannot sign more than distinct messages except with negligible probability.
2. Core Construction: The Hidden-Subspace One-Bit Scheme
The base construction employs the Aaronson–Christiano hidden-subspace approach, originally devised for quantum money:
- Choose a random subspace such that .
- The quantum signing token is .
- Public key: an obfuscated subspace membership predicate for both and its dual :
- Signing: To sign bit :
- If , measure in the computational basis: output .
- If , apply Hadamard gates () to get ; measure to output .
- Output or (unless the all-zero vector, which is forbidden).
- Verification: Accept if and .
This protocol is information-theoretically correct and achieves strong unclonability: no QPT adversary can extract more than a single valid signature per token.
3. Lifting to Full Digital Signatures
Three standard steps generalize the scheme:
- One-Bit to -Bit One-Time: Run multiple one-bit schemes in parallel for message blocks.
- Hash-and-Sign: Use a quantum-secure collision-resistant hash function so that only hashes of messages are ever signed, ensuring collision-freeness reduces to unforgeability.
- Amplify One-Time to Many-Use: Combine with a standard classical EUF-CMA digital signature (or symmetric MAC). Each signing uses a fresh quantum token; the package includes a classical signature of the token’s public key.
The result is a full-fledged, many-use signature system: any message can be signed (once per token), and the system inherits the unclonability and information-theoretic properties from the quantum primitive.
4. Security Arguments and Properties
4.1 Unforgeability via Quantum Money Lower Bounds
The adversary’s task reduces to finding both a nontrivial member of and from a single token—provably hard in the black-box oracle model. Theorems from Aaronson–Christiano and subsequent generalizations yield the following quantum lower bound:
queries are needed to output both signatures with success probability , which is infeasible for moderate ( suffices).
With a virtual-black-box (VBB) obfuscator for subspace-membership predicates, the same argument applies in practice: access to the public key does not materially aid the adversary except for negligible terms.
4.2 Revocability and Testability
Revocability:
The protocol allows status checking (was a token spent?) via the following:
- Randomly select a message, attempt to sign using , and verify. Fresh tokens accept with high probability. Spent tokens (post-measurement) cannot pass the test, except with negligible probability.
Testability:
Given read-only access, one may test token validity (without signing) by projective measurement. Any valid will pass, while adversarial states or spent tokens will fail except with negligible probability.
Everlasting Revocability:
Even a computationally unbounded adversary cannot, after measurement, produce more than one valid signature or evade revocation, establishing “everlasting” security.
4.3 Theorems
Some critical formal results (as in the referenced work):
- Unforgeability (Theorem 3.1, 3.6, 4.1.3): No QPT adversary given tokens can sign on distinct messages.
- Revocability (Theorem 3.2): Every unforgeable TS is revocable.
- Testability (Theorem 3.3): Any testable TS gives a public quantum money scheme.
- Everlasting Security: The one-bit hidden-subspace TS is information-theoretically one-time and everlasting-revocable.
5. Applications and Extensions
Applications arise in scenarios demanding non-repudiation and controlled delegation without exposing persistent keys:
- Access Control: Provide limited signing rights (e.g., for financial transactions) where each action consumes a quantum token.
- Online/Offline Key Management: Keep master keys offline; use tokens for controlled online signature issuance.
- Byzantine Consensus: Strong guarantees against equivocation in distributed protocols.
- Quantum Money and Cash-Out Mechanisms: A testable TS gives rise to a public-key quantum money scheme, and any token can be “cashed out” into a classical signed check by destroying the quantum token and creating a public signature.
Notably, the TS framework enables secure, auditable conversion of quantum “bills” into classical payment instruments—a practical bridge for quantum-secure commerce.
6. Practical Considerations, Limitations, and Open Questions
A TS construction depends on:
- The existence and efficiency of obfuscators for vector subspace membership. Standard models rely on VBB, though indistinguishability obfuscation may suffice.
- Quantum state coherence: tokens must survive real transmission and storage constraints.
- Fault tolerance: handling noisy or lossy quantum memories is an ongoing research direction.
Open questions include practical instantiation of required obfuscators under realistic assumptions, generalization to tokenized blind/ring signatures, and robustness under noise.
7. Summary Table
| Property | Achieved in TS Scheme | Caveat/Condition |
|---|---|---|
| Correctness | Yes: perfect for fresh token | Requires no overuse |
| Unforgeability | Information-theoretic in black-box/VBB settings | Efficient obfuscator needed |
| Revocability | Yes: public test, no secret key | |
| Testability | Yes: projective measurement of fresh state | Requires oracles or obfuscated pk |
| Everlasting Security | Yes: unbounded attacker cannot forge after spending |
The tokenized signature framework merges quantum money’s unclonability with classical signature semantics, yielding a cryptographically robust and versatile primitive for future quantum networks and secure delegated signing.