Learning Generalized Nash Equilibria in Non-Monotone Games with Quadratic Costs (2512.18330v1)

Abstract: We study generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problems in games with quadratic costs and individual linear equality constraints. Departing from approaches that require strong monotonicity and/or shared constraints, we reformulate the KKT conditions of the (generally non-monotone) games into a tractable convex program whose objective satisfies the Polyak-Lojasiewicz (PL) condition. This PL geometry enables a distributed gradient method over a fixed communication graph with global geometric (linear) convergence to a GNE. When gradient information is unavailable or costly, we further develop a zero-order fully distributed scheme in which each player uses only local cost evaluations and their own constraint residuals. With an appropriate step size policy, the proposed zero-order method converges to a GNE, provided one exists, at rate O(1/t).