How Conflict Aversion Can Enable Authoritarianism: An Evolutionary Dynamics Approach (2512.06245v1)

Abstract: We use evolutionary game theory to examine how conflict-averse centrism can unintentionally facilitate authoritarian success in polarized political conflicts. Many such conflicts are asymmetric: authoritarian actors can employ norm-breaking or coercive tactics, while democratic resistance faces stronger constraints on what counts as normatively acceptable behavior. Yet formal models typically treat opposing sides symmetrically and rarely examine conflict-averse behavior. Drawing on empirical research on protest backlash, civility norms, and authoritarian resilience, we model these dynamics as a three-strategy evolutionary game in which resistance, authoritarianism, and conflict-averse centrism interact under replicator dynamics. This framework yields two distinct outcomes -- cyclic resurgence of authoritarian strength through a heteroclinic cycle and a stable centrist-authoritarian coalition that excludes resistance -- depending on how actors respond to confrontation. The analysis shows how payoff differences can reorganize long-run dynamics in asymmetric conflicts. Our contribution is to demonstrate how an established dynamical framework, combined with empirically grounded behavioral assumptions, clarifies the strategic conditions under which conflict aversion can diminish the effectiveness of democratic resistance.