Resource-Aware Stealthy Attacks in Vehicle Platoons (2510.14119v1)

Abstract: Connected and Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs) are transforming modern transportation by enabling cooperative applications such as vehicle platooning, where multiple vehicles travel in close formation to improve efficiency and safety. However, the heavy reliance on inter-vehicle communication makes platoons highly susceptible to attacks, where even subtle manipulations can escalate into severe physical consequences. While existing research has largely focused on defending against attacks, far less attention has been given to stealthy adversaries that aim to covertly manipulate platoon behavior. This paper introduces a new perspective on the attack design problem by demonstrating how attackers can guide platoons toward their own desired trajectories while remaining undetected. We outline conditions under which such attacks are feasible, analyze their dependence on communication topologies and control protocols, and investigate the resources required by the attacker. By characterizing the resources needed to launch stealthy attacks, we address system vulnerabilities and informing the design of resilient countermeasures. Our findings reveal critical weaknesses in current platoon architectures and anomaly detection mechanisms and provide methods to develop more secure and trustworthy CAV systems.