Information-Theoretic Reward Modeling for Stable RLHF: Detecting and Mitigating Reward Hacking (2510.13694v1)

Abstract: Despite the success of Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) in aligning LLMs with human values, reward hacking-or reward over-optimization-remains a major challenge. We identify two key obstacles to its mitigation: (1) reward misgeneralization in reward modeling, where reward models overfit to spurious, preference-irrelevant features; and (2) the lack of suitable regularization during RL optimization, as existing token-level constraints often over-restrict the policy space. To address these issues, we propose InfoRM, an information-theoretic reward modeling framework based on the Information Bottleneck (IB) principle, which filters out preference-irrelevant information to alleviate reward misgeneralization. We further observe that reward-hacked responses manifest as pronounced outliers in InfoRM's IB latent space, measured by Mahalanobis distance from the SFT-induced distribution. Motivated by this, we introduce IBL, a distribution-level regularization that penalizes such deviations, effectively expanding the optimization landscape while maintaining alignment. We prove that IBL is theoretically equivalent to the pessimistic RL objective within the IB latent space. Finally, we present Mahalanobis Outlier Probability (MOP), a statistical metric for quantifying reward hacking severity, enabling principled hyperparameter tuning and online mitigation such as early stopping. Extensive experiments across diverse LLMs and datasets confirm the generality of our findings, the effectiveness of InfoRM and IBL, and the reliability of MOP as a diagnostic tool-collectively advancing the state of RLHF.