Asynchronous Predictive Counterfactual Regret Minimization$^+$ Algorithm in Solving Extensive-Form Games (2503.12770v1)

Abstract: Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) algorithms are widely used to compute a Nash equilibrium (NE) in two-player zero-sum imperfect-information extensive-form games (IIGs). Among them, Predictive CFR$^+$ (PCFR$^+$) is particularly powerful, achieving an exceptionally fast empirical convergence rate via the prediction in many games. However, the empirical convergence rate of PCFR$^+$ would significantly degrade if the prediction is inaccurate, leading to unstable performance on certain IIGs. To enhance the robustness of PCFR$^+$, we propose a novel variant, Asynchronous PCFR$^+$ (APCFR$^+$), which employs an adaptive asynchronization of step-sizes between the updates of implicit and explicit accumulated counterfactual regrets to mitigate the impact of the prediction inaccuracy on convergence. We present a theoretical analysis demonstrating why APCFR$^+$ can enhance the robustness. Finally, we propose a simplified version of APCFR$^+$ called Simple APCFR$^+$ (SAPCFR$^+$), which uses a fixed asynchronization of step-sizes to simplify the implementation that only needs a single-line modification of the original PCFR+. Interestingly, SAPCFR$^+$ achieves a constant-factor lower theoretical regret bound than PCFR$^+$ in the worst case. Experimental results demonstrate that (i) both APCFR$^+$ and SAPCFR$^+$ outperform PCFR$^+$ in most of the tested games, as well as (ii) SAPCFR$^+$ achieves a comparable empirical convergence rate with APCFR$^+$.