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The Effect of Noise on the Emergence of Continuous Norms and its Evolutionary Dynamics (2306.12345v2)

Published 21 Jun 2023 in cs.MA

Abstract: We examine the effect of noise on societies of agents using an agent-based model of evolutionary norm emergence. Generally, we see that noisy societies are more selfish, smaller and discontent, and are caught in rounds of perpetual punishment preventing them from flourishing. Surprisingly, despite the effect of noise on the population, it does not seem to evolve away. We carry out further analysis and provide reasons for why this may be the case. Furthermore, we claim that our framework that evolves the noise/ambiguity of norms may be a new way to model the tight/loose framework of norms, suggesting that despite ambiguous norms detrimental effect on society, evolution does not favour clarity.

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