Hiding Your Signals: A Security Analysis of PPG-based Biometric Authentication

Abstract: Recently, physiological signal-based biometric systems have received wide attention. Unlike traditional biometric features, physiological signals can not be easily compromised (usually unobservable to human eyes). Photoplethysmography (PPG) signal is easy to measure, making it more attractive than many other physiological signals for biometric authentication. However, with the advent of remote PPG (rPPG), unobservability has been challenged when the attacker can remotely steal the rPPG signals by monitoring the victim's face, subsequently posing a threat to PPG-based biometrics. In PPG-based biometric authentication, current attack approaches mandate the victim's PPG signal, making rPPG-based attacks neglected. In this paper, we firstly analyze the security of PPG-based biometrics, including user authentication and communication protocols. We evaluate the signal waveforms, heart rate and inter-pulse-interval information extracted by five rPPG methods, including four traditional optical computing methods (CHROM, POS, LGI, PCA) and one deep learning method (CL_rPPG). We conducted experiments on five datasets (PURE, UBFC_rPPG, UBFC_Phys, LGI_PPGI, and COHFACE) to collect a comprehensive set of results. Our empirical studies show that rPPG poses a serious threat to the authentication system. The success rate of the rPPG signal spoofing attack in the user authentication system reached 0.35. The bit hit rate is 0.6 in inter-pulse-interval-based security protocols. Further, we propose an active defence strategy to hide the physiological signals of the face to resist the attack. It reduces the success rate of rPPG spoofing attacks in user authentication to 0.05. The bit hit rate was reduced to 0.5, which is at the level of a random guess. Our strategy effectively prevents the exposure of PPG signals to protect users' sensitive physiological data.