The resilience of the multirelational structure of geopolitical treaties is critically linked to past colonial world order and offshore fiscal havens (2203.00618v1)

Abstract: The governance of the political and economic world order builds on a complex architecture of international treaties at various geographical scales. In a historical phase of high institutional turbulence, assessing the stability of such architecture with respect to the unilateral defection of single countries and to the breakdown of single treaties is important. We carry out this analysis on the whole global architecture and find that the countries with the highest disruption potential are not major world powers (with the exception of Germany and France) but mostly medium-small and micro-countries. Political stability is highly dependent on many former colonial overseas territories that are today part of the global network of fiscal havens, as well as on emerging economies, mostly from South-East Asia. Economic stability depends on medium sized European and African countries. However, single global treaties have surprisingly less disruptive potential, with the major exception of the WTO. These apparently counter-intuitive results highlight the importance to a nonlinear approach to international relations where the complex multilayered architecture of global governance is analyzed using advanced network science techniques. Our results suggest that the potential fragility of the world order seem to be much more directly related to global inequality and fiscal injustice than it is commonly believed, and that the legacy of the colonial world order is still very strong in the current international relations scenario. In particular, vested interests related to tax avoidance seem to have a structural role in the political architecture of global governance