Coordinating Multiagent Industrial Symbiosis (2006.01784v1)

Abstract: We present a formal multiagent framework for coordinating a class of collaborative industrial practices called Industrial Symbiotic Networks (ISNs) as cooperative games. The game-theoretic formulation of ISNs enables systematic reasoning about what we call the ISN implementation problem. Specifically, the characteristics of ISNs may lead to the inapplicability of standard fair and stable benefit allocation methods. Inspired by realistic ISN scenarios and following the literature on normative multiagent systems, we consider regulations and normative socio-economic policies as coordination instruments that in combination with ISN games resolve the situation. In this multiagent system, employing Marginal Contribution Nets (MC-Nets) as rule-based cooperative game representations foster the combination of regulations and ISN games with no loss in expressiveness. We develop algorithmic methods for generating regulations that ensure the implementability of ISNs and as a policy support, present the policy requirements that guarantee the implementability of all the desired ISNs in a balanced-budget way.