Papers
Topics
Authors
Recent
Search
2000 character limit reached

Replay Attacks and Defenses Against Cross-shard Consensus in Sharded Distributed Ledgers

Published 31 Jan 2019 in cs.CR | (1901.11218v4)

Abstract: We present a family of replay attacks against sharded distributed ledgers, that target cross-shard consensus protocols, such as the recently proposed Chainspace and Omniledger. They allow an attacker, with network access only, to double-spend or lock resources with minimal efforts. The attacker can act independently without colluding with any nodes, and succeed even if all nodes are honest; most of the attacks can also exhibit themselves as faults under periods of asynchrony. These attacks are effective against both shard-led and client-led cross-shard consensus approaches. Finally, we present Byzcuit - a new cross-shard consensus protocol that is immune to those attacks. We implement a prototype of Byzcuit and evaluate it on a real cloud-based testbed, showing that our defenses impact performance minimally, and overall performance surpasses previous works.

Citations (48)

Summary

  • The paper details replay attack vulnerabilities in cross-shard protocols, showing how attackers exploit message binding flaws to disrupt transaction integrity.
  • The paper introduces Byzcuit, a hybrid consensus protocol that uses session identifiers to secure cross-shard transactions while maintaining linear performance scalability.
  • Evaluations demonstrate Byzcuit’s efficiency improvements over systems like Chainspace, highlighting its potential for secure and scalable ledger applications.

Replay Attacks and Defenses in Sharded Distributed Ledgers

In the challenging domain of sharded distributed ledgers, this paper explores the vulnerabilities associated with cross-shard consensus protocols, specifically focusing on replay attacks. The authors present these attacks as a significant threat to systems like Chainspace and Omniledger, where an attacker can exploit the protocols to double-spend or lock resources without any node collusion. The paper meticulously outlines the mechanics of such attacks on both shard-led and client-led consensus approaches and proceeds to introduce Byzcuit, a new consensus protocol engineered to withstand these vulnerabilities while optimizing performance.

Key Contributions and Findings

  1. Replay Attack Vulnerabilities: The paper identifies replay attacks that target the cross-shard consensus protocols. These attacks exploit weaknesses where shards do not adequately bind messages to the instance of the protocol, thereby allowing attackers to replay messages from previous instances and disrupt the transactional integrity. The authors systematically demonstrate these vulnerabilities across two primary types of cross-shard consensus—shard-led and client-led—using Chainspace and Omniledger as case studies.
  2. Byzcuit Protocol Development: In response to these vulnerabilities, the authors propose Byzcuit, a hybrid consensus protocol that integrates effective elements from both shard-led and client-led approaches. Byzcuit employs a Transaction Manager that reduces cross-shard communication costs while ensuring resilience against replay attacks. This protocol introduces the use of session identifiers associated with transactions and ensures that all shards witness the complete protocol execution, thereby preventing any replay attack vectors.
  3. Performance Evaluation: The authors implement a prototype of Byzcuit and evaluate its performance in comparison with Chainspace and the theoretical base version of Byzcuit without replay defenses (byzcuit-baseline). Byzcuit maintains minimal performance impact from added defenses, demonstrating a throughput that scales linearly with the addition of shards and surpasses Chainspace's performance significantly.
  4. Impact on Real-world Applications: The paper discusses the potential impacts of these replay attacks on blockchain applications, such as double-spending in cryptocurrency transactions and multiple voting in secure electronic voting systems. This contextual understanding aids in comprehending the real-world significance of securing cross-shard consensus protocols.

Practical and Theoretical Implications

The practical implications of this research are vast, especially in enhancing the security and scalability of sharded blockchain systems. By establishing defenses against replay attacks, Byzcuit addresses a critical security concern, making it a viable protocol for real-world deployment in both financial and non-financial applications. Theoretically, the study expands the academic comprehension of cross-shard consensus mechanics, offering a framework that other researchers and developers can build upon to further optimize and secure blockchain technologies.

Future Directions in AI and Distributed Ledger Technology

The methodologies and insights provided by this paper lay a robust foundation for future research in both AI-driven optimizations and further security enhancements in sharded distributed ledgers. Subsequent developments could explore integrating machine learning techniques to predict and preemptively defend against complex attack vectors. Additionally, further examination of the communication trade-offs in consensus protocols could yield more efficient designs that balance performance and security, especially as these systems are scaled to global applications.

In conclusion, this paper contributes a pivotal perspective on the security and efficiency challenges faced by sharded distributed ledger technologies, presenting Byzcuit as a state-of-the-art solution that aligns both theoretical rigor and practical applicability. This work will likely serve as a cornerstone for future advancements in secure and scalable blockchain infrastructures.

Paper to Video (Beta)

Whiteboard

No one has generated a whiteboard explanation for this paper yet.

Open Problems

We haven't generated a list of open problems mentioned in this paper yet.

Continue Learning

We haven't generated follow-up questions for this paper yet.

Collections

Sign up for free to add this paper to one or more collections.