Optimal redundancy against disjoint vulnerabilities in networks

Abstract: Redundancy is commonly used to guarantee continued functionality in networked systems. However, often many nodes are vulnerable to the same failure or adversary. A "backup" path is not sufficient if both paths depend on nodes which share a vulnerability.For example, if two nodes of the Internet cannot be connected without using routers belonging to a given untrusted entity, then all of their communication-regardless of the specific paths utilized-will be intercepted by the controlling entity.In this and many other cases, the vulnerabilities affecting the network are disjoint: each node has exactly one vulnerability but the same vulnerability can affect many nodes. To discover optimal redundancy in this scenario, we describe each vulnerability as a color and develop a "color-avoiding percolation" which uncovers a hidden color-avoiding connectivity. We present algorithms for color-avoiding percolation of general networks and an analytic theory for random graphs with uniformly distributed colors including critical phenomena. We demonstrate our theory by uncovering the hidden color-avoiding connectivity of the Internet. We find that less well-connected countries are more likely able to communicate securely through optimally redundant paths than highly connected countries like the US. Our results reveal a new layer of hidden structure in complex systems and can enhance security and robustness through optimal redundancy in a wide range of systems including biological, economic and communications networks.