Commitment versus persuasion in the three-party constrained voter model

Abstract: In the framework of the three-party constrained voter model, where voters of two radical parties (A and B) interact with "centrists" (C and Cz), we study the competition between a persuasive majority and a committed minority. In this model, A's and B's are incompatible voters that can convince centrists or be swayed by them. Here, radical voters are more persuasive than centrists, whose sub-population consists of susceptible agents C and a fraction zeta of centrist zealots Cz. Whereas C's may adopt the opinions A and B with respective rates 1+delta_A and 1+delta_B (with delta_A>=delta_B>0), Cz's are committed individuals that always remain centrists. Furthermore, A and B voters can become (susceptible) centrists C with a rate 1. The resulting competition between commitment and persuasion is studied in the mean field limit and for a finite population on a complete graph. At mean field level, there is a continuous transition from a coexistence phase when zeta<Delta_c=delta_A/(1+delta_A) to a phase where centrism prevails when zeta>= Delta_c. In a finite population of size N, demographic fluctuations lead to centrism consensus and the dynamics is characterized by the mean consensus time tau. Because of the competition between commitment and persuasion, here consensus is reached much slower (zeta<Delta_c) or faster (zeta>=Delta_c) than in the absence of zealots (when tau\simN). In fact, when zeta<Delta_c and there is an initial minority of centrists, the mean consensus time asymptotically grows as tau\simN^{-1/2} e^{N gamma}, where gamma is determined. The dynamics is thus characterized by a metastable state where the most persuasive voters and centrists coexist when delta_A>delta_B, whereas all species coexist when delta_A=delta_B. When zeta>=Delta_c and the initial density of centrists is low, one finds tau\simln N (when N>>1). Our analytical findings are corroborated by stochastic simulations.