Boundary-only stability of stochastic FTRL limit sets
Establish whether, for finite games and standard regularizers, the only stochastically asymptotically stable limit sets of the stochastic follow-the-regularized-leader (S-FTRL) dynamics are entirely contained in the boundary of the game’s strategy space; that is, determine if every stochastically asymptotically stable set for S-FTRL must lie on the boundary.
References
We conjecture that there is an even stronger principle at play, namely that the only stochastically asymptotically stable limit sets of eq:FTRL-stoch are entirely contained on the boundary of the game's strategy space; we pose this as an open problem for the community.
                — The impact of uncertainty on regularized learning in games
                
                (2506.13286 - Cauvin et al., 16 Jun 2025) in Section 6, Concluding remarks